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The purpose of this study was to find out the challenges and opportunities of 
developing and operating multiple fast-food restaurants under an area 
development agreement. The goal of this thesis work was to identify the issues 
a prospective franchisee has to be aware of in order to successfully manage his 
mini-chain. 
 
The information for this thesis was gathered from literature, the Internet and by 
interviewing Russian area developers of different fast-food chains. The 
empirical data for this study was collected by interviewing companies’ 
representatives in person and by conducting video conferences in Skype. 
 
The results of this study indicate mainly the same issues that were expected to 
be found. These involve propositions concerning allocation of units, proximity of 
outlets, free-riding problems, uniformity of products, transfer of knowledge and 
local advertising practices, which were supported. The proposed agency 
problems were not found in the interviewed companies. Likewise, contrary to 
expectations, bulk purchase for multiple outlets is not what companies did to 
achieve economies of scale in procurement.   
 
Keywords: multi-unit franchising, franchisor, franchisee, area development 
agreement, fast-food industry, agency problem, economies of scale                 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Franchising has been growing rapidly in the U.S. since the 1950s. Many 
companies from different industries, such as fast-food restaurants, hotel chains, 
car rentals, have been actively using franchising to expand their operations 
elsewhere. The franchisor, owner of the business idea, shares his know-how 
with a franchisee. The latter can use the ready-made business model in 
exchange for a fee. Such an approach is called “business-format franchising” 
and the term “franchising’ is generally used to refer to this particular type. By the 
end of the 1960s the franchising had lost its initial rapid growth due to increased 
competition and ultimately the U.S. market was saturated with franchised 
businesses. Consequently, franchisors began to expand their operations across 
the borders by means of foreign partners. By doing so franchisors managed to 
have their branches overseas without actually investing venture capital. The 
franchisees in-turn were able to adopt a ready-made business model to their 
local markets. 
Nowadays franchising is a common way of doing business. Despite the fact that 
many franchisees operate only one outlet, it is important to point out that most 
franchised chains involve multi-unit ownership. This organizational arrangement 
allows the franchisee to operate more than one outlet in a particular franchise 
system. Several studies have indicated the importance of multi-unit franchising 
in the U.S. Kaufmann and Dant (1996) found that 88% of the 152 fast-food 
chains they surveyed had multi-unit franchisees. During the period of 1980-
1990, 61.5% of all new McDonald’s restaurants were opened by existing 
franchisees (Kaufmann & Lafontaine 1994). Bradach (1995) conducted a study 
of five fast-food franchise systems and reported the average number of units 
per franchisee to range from 2.7 to 22. Finally, the IFA Educational Foundation 
(2002) reported that in the 145 franchised systems they had surveyed 20 
percent of franchisees operated 52.6% of units. Based on this data, Blair and 
Lafontaine (2005, p. 50) concluded that “multi-unit ownership is present at least 
to some degree in all franchised chains, and a large proportion of franchised 
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units belong to multi-unit franchisees”. All in all, the findings above show that 
multi-unit ownership stimulated the growth of franchising as a whole and the 
fast-food industry in particular. 
So far the studies on multi-unit franchising have mostly considered how this 
type of ownership affects the franchisor and his chain. One of its main 
advantages is the positive effect on the system’s growth rate (Kaufmann & Dant 
1996). Bradach (1995) found that franchisors are exposed to less risk and have 
a better control of their foreign operations when allocating new units to existing 
franchisees. In addition, he reported that multi-unit franchising outperforms 
single-unit franchising in maintaining uniformity within the chain and system- 
wide adaptation to competition. He also noted that, on the downside, multi-unit 
owners might not adapt to local conditions as well as single-unit franchisees do. 
Still the literature lacks the information about multi-unit franchising from the 
franchisee perspective. It would be useful to know the motivational factors that 
make prospective franchisees choose this type of ownership. In addition, it is in 
the author’s interest to find out what the challenges and opportunities of 
managing multiple outlets under an area development agreement are.  
This survey focuses on the fast-food industry. This industry has always been 
associated with franchising. Although the U.S. market has become saturated 
with fast-food restaurants, this type of business still has great opportunities in 
other countries and keeps growing at a steady rate.       
 
1.2 Objectives and delimitations 
The purpose of this study is to find out the challenges and opportunities of 
developing and operating multiple units under an area development agreement. 
This study will be useful for those who are interested in opening a franchising 
business, particularly a fast-food restaurant, and consider multi-unit ownership. 
This research is focused on franchising restaurants operating in the fast-food 
segment, such as burger restaurants, sandwich makers and coffee shops, 
although the findings might be applied to other types of businesses, too. Saint-
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Petersburg and Moscow, the two largest cities in Russia, are the target regions. 
They have a big population and there are numerous restaurants operating in 
both of them. The considered franchisees are large area developers who have 
exclusive rights to open multiple units in a particular region. 
 
1.3 Research question 
The main question the author aims to answer is the following: 
• What are the challenges and opportunities of multi-unit franchising in the fast-
food industry from the franchisee perspective? 
The questions listed below are the sub-questions that help to answer the major 
one: 
• What are the benefits and constraints of multi-unit ownership? 
• Which factors have to be considered by a potential multi-unit franchisee?              
• What are the determinants of success in this business? 
These questions are answered by reviewing literature and previous studies on 
multi-unit franchising. In addition, several area developers operating in Moscow 
and Saint-Petersburg are contacted. They share their knowledge and 
experience of managing multiple restaurants under an area development 
agreement.  
  
1.4 Theoretical framework 
This section develops a theoretical framework for the study. It begins with a 
general definition of franchising and its types. The franchise contract, its terms 
and conditions, as well as associated fees, are also covered.  
In the section devoted to multi-unit franchising the author describes three types 
of multi-unit ownership: subfranchising, area development, and sequential 
expansion. These types of ownership are further analyzed in terms of their 
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benefits and constraints to the franchisor and the franchising system as a 
whole. After that the study considers the franchisee’s perspective on multi-unit 
franchising with a greater emphasis on an area development agreement. Based 
on the franchising theory and previous research, the author develops a set of 
propositions concerning the possible challenges and opportunities multi-unit 
owners might encounter.                   
     
1.5 Empirical part 
1.5.1 Case companies 
The objective of this research is to identify the challenges and opportunities of 
multi-unit franchising from a franchisee perspective. In order to acquire 
empirical data, several area developers operating in Saint-Petersburg and 
Moscow are contacted. They are asked to share their knowledge and 
experience of managing multiple restaurants. In addition, a quick overview of 
the Russian fast-food industry is provided. This will help a prospective 
franchisee to get familiar with the past and current situation on this market. 
 
1.5.2 Research method 
The research method is qualitative and a semi-structured interview is conducted 
in order to gather the information. A set of open-ended questions are formed in 
advance and the interviewees are asked to give detailed answers and elaborate 
on certain topics if necessary. 
The qualitative method allows the researcher to investigate social phenomenon 
and get an in-depth understanding of someone’s viewpoints and attitudes. 
Although normally the sample is smaller than in a quantitative method, the 
research is focused to a larger extent on each particular case. (Saunders, Lewis 
& Thornhill 2009.)     
The methodology chosen is appropriate because it gives the interviewee 
freedom to speak and helps interviewer to get additional information and come 
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up with new questions during the interview. However, such an approach might 
make it difficult for the researcher to generalize the findings due to a small 
sample. (Saunders, et al. 2009.) 
   
1.6 Thesis structure 
This research paper is organized in five sections. Section two presents the 
theoretical framework for this study and develops propositions based on 
existing literature and previous research. Those propositions are then tested in 
the light of the data gathered from the interviews. The research methodology 
and the case companies are described in section three. The findings are 
discussed in section four and a relevant conclusion is made along with 
recommendations for future research in section five. 
 
2 Theoretical framework  
2.1 Definition and types of franchising 
Meaney (2004, p.11) defines franchising as “a legal business arrangement, 
governed and created by a contract, under which the franchisor 
(owner/supplier) sells to a franchisee (retailer/buyer) the right to sell certain 
goods and/or services of the supplier under specific, agreed-upon conditions”.  
There are two major types of franchise arrangements: traditional (product or 
trade name) and business-format franchising. In traditional franchising the 
franchisee purchases the right to use the franchisor’s trademark/brand name 
and distribute his products. The franchisor acts as a manufacturer who sells his 
products to the franchisees for further reselling. He earns profit by imposing 
markups on those products. However, he does not receive any royalties 
(monthly payments) from sales. Automobile dealerships, gasoline service 
stations and soft-drink bottlers are the biggest users of traditional franchising 
nowadays. (Blair & Lafontaine 2005.) 
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In business-format franchising the franchisor provides a complete business 
model and continuous support to his franchisee. In exchange for that, 
franchisee pays franchising fee, a lump-sum fixed payment at the beginning of 
the agreement, and royalties, monthly payments calculated as a fixed 
percentage of franchisee’s gross sales. In addition, all franchisees contribute 
specified portion of their revenues to a company’s advertising fund. Typical 
examples of business-format franchising are retail stores, fast-food restaurants, 
hotel chains, etc. (Blair & Lafontaine 2005.) 
 
2.2 Franchise contract  
This section discusses the franchise contract and its terms. To begin with, there 
is a review of the monetary terms, such as franchise fees, royalty payments and 
advertising fees that a franchisee is obligated to pay to a franchisor. Then the 
discussion moves on to non-monetary clauses, such as the obligations of both 
parties and other terms of the contract. 
 
2.2.1 Monetary terms  
Franchise fee is an initial lump-sum fee that is paid only once at the beginning 
of the contract period. It may vary among the franchisees of a given chain for 
three main reasons. The first one is the size of the territory the franchisee is 
granted or its market potential. The second one is the type of the franchised 
unit. For example, a free-standing fast-food restaurant and one located at a 
food-court would be charged different fees. Thirdly, franchisors may require 
different fees for additional units sold to existing franchisees, or for area 
developers who are obligated to develop multiple units. This happens mainly 
due to the fact that the franchise fee is considered as a compensation to the 
franchisor for incurred costs of helping the franchisee to establish his business. 
Since existing franchises need less training and assistance, it is less costly for 
the franchisor to support them and, therefore, he requires a lower fee. 
Moreover, the franchise fees vary across industries. The fees in sit-down 
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restaurants are relatively high, whereas the fees for contractors and personal 
services sectors are lower on average. (Blair & Lafontaine 2005, pp. 56-60.) 
In addition to fixed franchise fees, franchisors normally charge ongoing 
payments, called royalty payments, throughout the life of the contract. In most 
cases this payment is calculated as a percentage of gross sales. It may also be 
a fixed monthly or weekly amount. Some franchisors also require a minimum of 
royalty payments. Such an arrangement is especially justified when the 
franchisees’ sales are low. The percentage rates may also increase or decrease 
for some franchisees as their sales reach target levels. Like the franchise fees, 
royalty payments vary across sectors. For example, lower royalty rates are 
prevalent in retail sectors, whereas higher ones are common in education, 
maintenance and personal services. (Blair & Lafontaine 2005, pp. 62-65.) 
Advertising fees are additional payments stipulated in the franchise contract. 
They are defined as contributions to national, regional or local advertising 
budgets. Similar to royalty payments, advertising fees may be a percentage of 
gross sales or a fixed monthly/weekly payment. In the case of local advertising, 
the franchisor often defines a minimum amount or percentage of sales the 
franchisee has to spend on advertising. Franchisors may also change the rates 
later on as stated in the disclosure documents. The advertising fees are 
relatively high in a few sectors, such as automotive and health and fitness. In 
other sectors the fees are significantly lower. (Blair & Lafontaine 2005, pp. 69-
71.)   
 
2.2.2 Non-monetary clauses 
This chapter discusses the obligations of the franchisor and franchisee. Most of 
the franchisee’s duties are ongoing. The franchisee is generally obligated to: 
- make on time payments 
- contribute to an advertising fund 
- use the system trademark in a predetermined manner 
- follow the manual when operating the business 
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- operate within a specific territory or location 
- attend a mandatory training program  
- and maintain certain business hours (Meaney 2004, p. 96). 
The franchisor’s duties are basically immediate and not on-going. The 
franchisor is generally required to: 
- grant a specific territory 
- approve the initial location 
- provide training 
- give an operations manual 
- assist with the grand opening 
- help with the purchase of equipment and inventory 
- administer the advertising requirements 
- offer initial assistance and advice 
- and buy from specified suppliers (Meaney 2004, p. 96). 
The franchising contract also contains the following items: 
- duration of the agreement 
- the franchise purchase price 
- financing terms 
- size and exclusivity of the territory 
- renewal terms 
- termination of the contract 
- transfer or sale of the franchise 
- product and equipment purchase requirements (Meaney 2004, pp. 97-
98). 
  
2.3 Multi-unit franchising 
2.3.1 Types 
Unlike single-unit, multi-unit franchising involves ownership of multiple units 
within a certain area or in different locations. This type of ownership requires 
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higher initial investments but also lowers the risk since the company is not 
dependent only on one unit. Also multiple units are typically sold at a reduced 
rate - this is another benefit of multi-unit franchising. 
There are two types of multi-unit franchising: master franchising and sequential 
expansion. Firstly, master franchising is a form of an umbrella licensing 
agreement which has two essential points: it grants an exclusive territory to the 
franchisee and creates an additional layer of control between store level 
management and the franchisor. Master franchising is further divided into 
subfranchising and an area development agreement. In subfranchising the 
franchisor grants the master franchisee (subfranchisor) the right to sell 
franchises to third parties (subfranchisees) within a specified territory. The 
master franchisee does not operate the subfranchised units himself. Instead, he 
assumes the role of franchisor and provides the recruitment, training and 
supervision of subfranchisees. (Kaufmann & Kim 1995.)                 
In an area development agreement, the master franchisee (area developer) is 
granted the right to open outlets within an exclusive territory. He is not only 
entitled, but also obligated to develop a specified number of units within a 
particular territory. The developer signs an area development agreement in the 
beginning and separate franchise agreements for each individual unit opened. 
The area development agreement also sets the timetable for opening each 
outlet. (Kaufmann & Kim 1995.)                 
Secondly, the sequential expansion is another form of multi-unit ownership. 
After the franchisee has demonstrated his ability to manage a single unit, he is 
granted the right to open additional ones. Quite often each additional unit 
requires a lower franchising fee, which is a good incentive for a franchisee. 
(Blair & Lafontaine 2005.) 
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2.3.2 Franchisor’s perspective 
Multi-unit franchising is a pervasive phenomenon nowadays and many 
franchisors encourage this type of ownership. This section will describe the 
reasons why franchisors are interested in multi-unit commitment. 
The primary factor that most of researchers have considered in favor of multi-
unit franchising is the higher system growth rates. Kaufmann and Dant (1996) 
argue that multi-unit franchising allows the franchisor a greater access to 
capital, which facilitates the system’s growth. This is especially noticeable in 
area development where franchisor has an access to large blocks of funds 
provided by franchisees (area developers). Kaufmann and Kim (1995) note that 
an area development agreement permits the franchisor to focus on recruiting, 
screening and training of a single area developer in each particular market who 
then, in-turn, develops his territory. This allows parallel development of multiple 
markets and positively affects system growth. 
On the other hand, the franchisor assumes a great risk when he grants the right 
to an exclusive territory to the area developer. The success of a chain in a 
particular market is then dependent on the performance of the local developer 
who controls his mini-chain. In addition, the franchisor has to spend more 
resources and time on recruiting, screening and training of the area developer 
than he would do for a single-unit owner. (Kaufmann & Kim 1995.) 
In the case of sequential expansion, increases in growth rates arise from less 
time spent on recruiting, screening and training. Current franchisees have the 
necessary experience and skills to conduct these procedures more efficiently 
than the first-comers would do. In this type of ownership it is easier for the firm 
(franchisor) to control adverse selection and moral hazard and thus reduce 
agency costs. Still the sequential nature of this expansion puts significant limits 
on the system’s growth. (Kaufmann & Dant 1996.) 
In subfranchising, like in an area development agreement, the franchisor can 
achieve higher growth rates by developing several markets in parallel. He 
conducts the recruiting, screening and training of the individual subfranchisors, 
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who then sell the franchise rights to their subfranchisees. It is more difficult to 
recruit a subfranchisor than a single unit franchisee due to the up-front fee 
charged for the right to subfranchise. However, it takes less time and effort to 
recruit a subfranchisor than an area developer since the former does not have 
to invest as much capital to open the stores. (Kaufmann & Kim 1995.) 
Despite the benefits of subfranchising, it might be quite challenging for the 
franchisor to screen and train subfranchisors in each market. Sometimes he 
would also need to screen potential subfranchisees, even though the 
subfranchisor has already done it. This might slow the rate of growth within 
each market. In addition, subfranchising creates an additional layer of control 
between the system franchisor and the subfranchisees and therefore involves 
additional management costs. Furthermore, the system does not benefit from 
the economies of scale of a large chain since subfranchising spreads the units 
across various markets. (Kaufmann & Kim 1995.)    
                                          
2.3.3 Franchisee’s perspective 
In general, multi-unit franchising helps a franchisee to lower the business and 
financial risks of a single restaurant by spreading them among several units. In 
addition, it tends to minimize fixed costs per each outlet and maximize sales 
potential on the market. Furthermore, it normally helps to strengthen the 
relationship with the franchisor by means of higher commitment resulting from 
operating multiple units. 
Multi-unit franchising allows franchisees to enjoy economies of scale derived 
from operating a chain of outlets. This is mostly noticeable in an area 
development agreement, where the operator creates a mini-chain from the 
outset. However, the area developer invests significantly more capital and 
assumes a greater risk than a single-unit owner. (Kaufmann & Kim 1995.)  
In addition, the area developer faces the same agency problem in managing the 
outlets as the franchisor does in running the company-owned units. The 
problem arises from a possible shirking and moral hazard of the store level 
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managers who operate the units. It is particularly hard for the franchisee to 
monitor his operations if the territory is large and the units are geographically 
dispersed. (Kaufmann & Kim 1995.) 
In subfranchising, the master franchisee benefits from the franchise fees and 
ongoing royalties received from his subfranchisees. Nevertheless, he has to pay 
the up-front fee and take the obligation to develop his territory by means of 
selling subfranchise rights. Therefore, he has to utilize his resources on 
attracting potential subfranchisees, their screening and initial training, and 
assistance in opening the units. He is also in charge of forming the advertising 
budget and collecting advertising fees. (Kaufmann & Kim 1995.) 
 
2.3.4 Area development agreement 
This chapter focuses on area development agreement and its elements. Also 
the challenges and opportunities of this type of ownership in relation to a 
franchisee are reviewed. 
As mentioned above, an area development agreement grants the franchisee the 
right to develop a certain number of franchised units within a specified territory 
over a given period of time. The area granted to the developer is exclusive and 
no other franchisee can open units within this territory without the franchisor’s 
permission. The area developer agrees to comply with a development schedule 
and open new units by certain dates. (Lowell 2006.) 
Normally, the franchisor issues a single development agreement, governing the 
development of all units, and individual franchise agreements for each unit the 
franchisee is about to open. The development agreement locks in the conditions 
applicable to all units to be developed, such as site selection and construction 
provisions, whereas individual franchise agreements reflect the then-current 
terms at the times the agreements are signed. (Lowell 2006.) 
The development agreement has an expiration date and if the franchisee 
completes the development schedule prior to that date, he might be penalized 
for early loss of his exclusive rights. In other case, the franchisee might be 
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offered an option to develop additional units. He also has the right of first refusal 
to any additional franchise or development agreements the franchisor offers 
after the completion of the development schedule. (Lowell 2006.) 
The franchisee pays a development fee for the right to develop the territory and 
franchise fees for each individual unit opened. As the developer opens more 
units, he is charged a lower franchise fee for each subsequent outlet. The 
franchisor may establish franchise fees in advance or at the time each unit is 
developed based on then-current market conditions. (Lowell 2006.) 
In the case of the franchisee’s default to meet the development schedule, the 
franchisor may impose certain sanctions, such as reducing the size of the 
granted territory, limiting development rights, or accelerating or slowing the 
development schedule. Termination of the agreement is an extreme penalty for 
the default. (Lowell 2006.)                      
 
2.4 Challenges and opportunities 
2.4.1 Management problems 
An agency relationship is a contractual arrangement under which one person 
(the principal) engages another person (the agent) to perform some service on 
his behalf. The agent is also granted some decision-making authority. 
Sometimes the agent does not act in the best interests of the principal – this is 
the so-called “agency problem”. The principal can avoid this problem by 
establishing appropriate incentives for the agent and monitoring the agent’s 
behavior. (Jensen & Meckling 1976.) 
The agency problem can be found in all organizational forms, and franchising is 
not an exception. In the beginning, company owners (franchisors) were 
considering franchising as a way to reduce agency problems in the company-
owned units. They transferred the ownership of the units to the individual 
franchisees, who acted as the managers of those outlets. The franchisees had 
the incentives to do their job properly to make their restaurants prosper. When 
owning multiple units, however, the owner (principal) has to hire managers 
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(agents) to operate the outlets. Those managers do not have an ownership 
interest in the firm and normally have low incentives to act in the owner’s 
interests. The owner, therefore, needs to monitor the behavior of the managers 
in order to ensure the success of his mini-chain. The problem is that it may be 
quite complicated to monitor all units, especially when they are geographically 
dispersed. (Kaufmann 1992.) 
Brickley and Dark (1987) have supported their hypothesis that franchisor-owned 
units are better monitored if they are located close to the headquarters or to 
each other. It is possible to draw a parallel between franchisor-owned units and 
those owned by an area developer, since in both cases the owners need to hire 
managers. For this reason, the multi-unit franchisee might also be willing to 
form such clusters of units that are close to each other in order to make the 
monitoring process more efficient. Based on the above findings, the following 
two propositions can be made:      
P1: Using an area development agreement creates an agency problem 
between the units owner and store-level managers. 
P2: Proper allocation of outlets helps the owner to monitor the units more 
efficiently and thus reduce agency costs. 
  
2.4.2 Proximity of units 
One of the most noticeable issues in franchising is intra-channel conflict, called 
encroachment. When a franchisor adds new units in close proximity to the 
outlets owned by existing franchisees, those new units may cannibalize the 
sales of the existing stores. In order to prevent this conflict, some policymakers 
have introduced regulations aimed to defend the existing franchisees and even 
gave them an exclusive territory (Kalnins 2004).  
Under an area development agreement, a franchisee is the only one who 
makes decisions upon opening new units within his territory. He, therefore, 
cannot face the problem of encroachment by definition. Nevertheless, he may 
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still allocate new units in an unfavorable way to the existing ones, as described 
further in this section. 
The success of each new unit the franchisee considers to open depends upon 
the location chosen and the customer traffic, the number of people that walk by 
that place. A good example with high customer traffic would be a restaurant 
located at a food-court in a shopping center. Thanks to other tenants (shops, 
restaurants) there is a constant flow of people and some portion of them might 
stop by your restaurant. However, as many restaurants are willing to occupy 
those spots at food-courts, there is tough competition among brands for vacant 
spaces. 
Based on the agency theory, it was suggested that in order to monitor the units 
more efficiently, the franchisee would like to have them close to each other. The 
question that comes next is how close the units should be located. Adding a 
new unit in very close proximity to an existing restaurant may steal some portion 
of its sales and thus jeopardize the performance of the existing outlet, just like in 
the case of encroachment. On the other hand, customers may get used to 
visiting one particular restaurant and adding another unit in close proximity may 
not provide significant benefits. A food-court restaurant in a shopping center can 
be an exception. If, for example, there are two closely located shopping centers 
with high customer traffics and there are restaurants of a particular brand in 
each of them, then both of those restaurants might operate successfully, all else 
equal. However, this is not the case for stationary restaurants that share the 
same boundaries.   
To sum up, not only should a franchisee choose a location with high customer 
traffic for a new restaurant, but he also needs to assess the proximity of other 
restaurants of the same brand and their possible effect on the new restaurant 
and vice versa. The next proposition is as follows:                                                                   
P3: Placing a new restaurant in close proximity to an existing one may 
negatively affect the performance of the existing outlet and vice versa. 
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2.4.3 Free-riding problems 
The free-riding problem arises when some of the franchisees reduce the quality 
of their products or services to maximize profit, or contribute fewer resources to 
promotion or advertising. The incentive to free-ride is particularly high if the level 
of repeat customer is low. This behavior depreciates the overall reputation of 
the chain and the future profits. Nevertheless, franchisees who cheat on quality 
bear only part of this cost and free-ride on the services provided by the 
franchisor or other franchisees. (Brickley & Dark 1987.)  
A multi-unit owner is extremely concerned with the quality of the products, since 
he assumes a greater risk of losing his customers caused by the quality 
disregard of other franchisees. The multi-unit owner might suffer even more 
from quality debasement at another unit if it is situated in close proximity to him. 
The best way to combat this problem would be allowing a franchisee to own 
geographically close units. Brickley (1999) suggests that using an area 
development agreement would be an effective way to solve the free-riding 
problem.  Under an area development agreement the franchisee is the 
exclusive owner and operator of the units in a particular market. Therefore, he 
has high-powered incentives to provide high quality products and services to 
sustain a good image among his customers. 
P4: Using an area development agreement helps a multi-unit owner to avoid 
free-riding problems by controlling all units within his market and ensuring the 
quality of products and services provided. 
 
2.4.4 Uniformity of products 
In addition to good quality, customers expect to get uniform products in any 
outlet within the franchised system. They might not like a product that is 
different from the one they used to have in other stores. The franchisees, 
therefore, need to have consistency of their operations and maintain uniformity 
of their products and services in order to meet customers’ expectations.   
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Uniformity brings several operational advantages. According to Blair and 
Lafontaine (2005), uniform operations across the units facilitate economies of 
scale in procurement and marketing. In addition, uniform operations allow 
easier and less costly introduction of new products and processes. It would be 
much easier for the head office to establish, for example, new production 
procedures across units that are similar to each other. Finally, uniformity helps 
to collect and compare the information about the performance of different 
outlets, for example sales, costs, and best practices. It helps a franchisee to 
evaluate individual units and transmit the information to store-level managers. 
Ultimately, this reduces training and monitoring costs. 
Bradach (1995) has found a positive effect of using multi-unit franchising on 
maintaining uniformity within the chain. It can be presumed that this effect is 
strengthened in the context of an area development agreement, since all units 
are operated by a single owner. He, therefore, has better incentives to maintain 
uniformity within his mini-chain and enjoy corresponding operational 
advantages. 
P5: Using an area development agreement helps to maintain uniformity within a 
mini-chain and obtain corresponding operational advantages. 
 
2.4.5 Transfer of knowledge             
Multi-unit ownership can facilitate transfer of knowledge between units. Some 
outlets may experience efficiencies in their operations, for example in 
procurement or production, and later on share their practices with other 
restaurants. This approach facilitates improving the overall performance of the 
chain and disposing of certain defects in the system. Such an ability to transmit 
knowledge between units makes multi-unit franchising an efficient form of 
organization.  
Darr, Argote and Epple (1995) have found that it is easier and more likely to 
transfer knowledge between commonly owned stores than between individually 
owned units. Basically, outlets can transmit knowledge through regular 
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communication, personal acquaintances and frequent meetings. The stores 
owned by the same franchisee tend to communicate more frequently and have 
more meetings and therefore create a greater transfer of knowledge. Darr et al. 
(1995) also noted in their study that the stores of single-unit owners were not 
able to benefit from the production experience at other stores, and therefore 
were less productive than their multi-unit counterparts. 
As the number of units grows, so does the overall learning process and transfer 
of knowledge within a chain. Each new restaurant can come up with a new 
solution to routine problems and suggest it to other stores. The geographic 
proximity of commonly owned units is expected to facilitate regular 
communication and frequent meetings between store managers and induce a 
mutual learning process. Consistent with these statements, an area 
development agreement would be an effective way to transfer knowledge 
between the units and ultimately increase the efficiency of the mini-chain. 
P6: Using an area development agreement helps to induce mutual learning and 
transfer of knowledge between commonly owned units. 
 
2.4.6 Bulk purchases 
A business owner can achieve great savings in procurement if he purchases in 
bulk. The franchised restaurants not only offer uniform products, but also use 
standardized inputs to produce them. If they purchase large volumes by 
aggregating their orders, they can negotiate good deals and get sufficient 
discounts from local vendors. Small chain operators cannot achieve economies 
of scale in procurement on their own. A multi-unit owner, on the contrary, can 
combine orders from his units and purchase greater volumes (Hashim 2010). 
He can form a wholly-owned purchasing division, similar to a purchasing 
cooperative owned by different franchisees, and place orders from different 
units through a centralized system. On this way he will not only achieve 
economies of scale in procurement, but also get uniform products for all his 
units (Loonam 2010).       
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Through a centralized system, operators of commonly owned restaurants may 
place orders based on the individual needs of each outlet. Those orders might 
then be consolidated and forwarded to the chosen vendor. The supplier can 
streamline his operations and achieve efficiency in production by producing 
large quantity of goods, which by-turn gives him an incentive to lower prices. 
(OECD 2000.)          
Despite the efficiency of this approach, it might be quite complicated to ensure 
smooth flow of goods to the restaurants. By combining orders from different 
units the franchisee gives up the flexibility in procurement of individual store. 
Some restaurants may have specific requirements depending on their level of 
output.  As a result, it would be challenging to satisfy procurement needs of 
different units simultaneously.  
P7: Multi-unit owner might achieve economies of scale in procurement by 
purchasing in bulk for several restaurants.        
 
2.4.7 Advertising 
As the number of units grows, the economies of scale in advertising increases 
as well. The fixed costs of advertising are spread out over more units, thus 
making the average cost per outlet lower. Blair and Lafontaine (2005) have 
suggested that while individual units can specialize in production and 
distribution processes at the local level, the franchisor can focus on national or 
regional advertising that will benefit all the units in the chain. As a result, the 
system as a whole will enjoy economies of scale in both sets of activities. 
According to Blair and Lafontaine (2005), advertising in the franchise system is 
a public good for all the franchisees, since all of them benefit from the same 
advertising. However, each restaurant has to contribute some percentage of 
their gross sales to the advertising budget. The bigger the number of outlets the 
franchisee operates, the more money he has to contribute. Therefore, a multi-
unit owner would contribute more funds to the advertising budget comparing to 
a single-unit franchisee. In addition, under an area development agreement, the 
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franchisee would be the only one who contributes to the local advertising fund 
and therefore would bear the full cost of local promotional activities. At the same 
time, he would be the sole person, who makes decisions upon the media 
selection and promotion techniques in his region. In addition, he would make 
sure that all the money spent on advertising would go directly to fulfil this 
purpose.     
P8: Under an area development agreement, the franchisee bears the full cost of 
local advertising and has an authority to make decisions on budget allocation 
and promotional techniques.  
 
3 Research design 
3.1 Research method 
The empirical part of this study was carried out using a qualitative research 
method. The qualitative method allows the researcher to investigate social 
phenomenon and get an in-depth understanding of someone’s viewpoints and 
experience. Although normally the sample is smaller than in a quantitative 
study, the research is more intensively focused on each particular case. 
(Saunders, et al. 2009.) 
      
3.2 Overview of the Russian fast-food market  
The Russian fast-food market has been growing since 1990, when the first 
McDonald’s restaurant was opened. Although there were quite many 
restaurants of domestic cuisine, such as pancakes, pasties and dumplings, 
Russian customers have become interested in new concepts. After foreign 
players saw a significant growth potential in the Russian market, they have 
been actively expanding their operations there. McDonald’s, Baskin Robbins, 
Subway and Sbarro were among the first entrants (Memoid 2011).   
 
24 
 
Since 2000 the Russian fast-food market has experienced a rapid growth, and 
by 2006 the annual growth rates were more than 30%. The annual turnover in 
2008 was $2 billion and by 2010 it has reached the level of $3 billion. In 2012 
the turnover was estimated to amount to $7.8 billion. (Alto Consulting Group 
2013.) The global recession gave an additional boost to the growth of the fast-
food industry and provided significant benefits to operators. During the period of 
2008-2009 the rents dropped by 20% in shopping malls and by 15-30% 
elsewhere. Despite the decline in sales volume, the number of new customers 
increased. People were forced to cut down their spending on eating out in 
expensive restaurants and switch to cheaper alternatives. (Kommersant 2009.)  
As for the total number of Russian fast-food outlets, in 2013 it was 3,354. 
Subway was the absolute leader in the number of restaurants, 514 units in 
Russia. It was followed by McDonald’s owning 413 outlets. KFC, one of the 
most popular chains among Russian customers, had 201 units. Overall, the 
fast-food market grew by 16% in 2013. Many experts believe that it is not yet 
saturated and is open for new entrants, especially in regional areas. 
(FranchisingINFO 2014.) 
 
3.3 Case companies 
For the purpose of this study, a search was made to find large area developers 
in the Saint-Petersburg and Moscow regions, who had exclusive rights to open 
outlets within their area. Most of the operators developed units in their regions, 
while also selling subfranchise rights to franchisees in other towns. As was 
found, all area developers under study were legal entities with sufficient capital 
and previous experience in the restaurant business. They have proven their 
ability to maintain a mini-chain of outlets and were committed to long-term 
development process. After careful screening and assessment, area developers 
of five restaurant chains were selected: Carls Jr., Coffeeshop Company, 
Dunkin’ Donuts, Baskin Robbins and Wendy’s. 
The first area developer is OOO Bright Star, a master franchisee of Carl’s Jr., 
an American burger restaurant chain. Since 2006 it has developed more than 
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30 restaurants, 26 of which are located in Saint-Petersburg. In 2013 it started 
implementing sub-franchising, selling the franchise rights to other franchisees, 
and is planning to expand across the country. (Carl’s Jr. Official Website.) 
The second one is OOO Coffee Set, a master franchisee of Austrian coffee 
house chain Coffeeshop Company. The company is actively developing its 
franchising network in Russia and so far has opened 78 coffee shops. The 
majority of outlets have been opened in Saint Petersburg by the company itself. 
The remaining ones are subfranchised to other cities. (Coffeeshop Company 
Official Website.) 
OOO Donuts Project is the exclusive owner of a master franchise of Dunkin’ 
Donuts, an American brand specializing in donuts and coffee beverages. The 
company operates restaurants solely in the Moscow area. Since 2010 it has 
developed 30 units. (Dunkin’ Donuts Official Website.) 
ZAO BRPI is a master franchisee of the ice cream shops chain Baskin Robbins. 
Baskin Robbins is the oldest franchised chain in Russia. The first café was 
opened in 1992 and now there are 278 cafes across the country. 55 of them 
have been opened in the Moscow area by ZAO BRPI. (Baskin Robbins Official 
Website.)      
OOO WenRus Restaurant Group is a master franchisee of the American burger 
restaurant chain Wendy’s. Since 2011 it has opened 8 restaurants in Moscow 
and is planning to start selling subfranchises to other regions. (Wendy’s Official 
Website.)  
 
3.4 Data collection and analysis 
For the purpose of collecting data, the semi-structured interview format was 
chosen. This type of an interview aims to explore events or phenomenon and 
allows obtaining a rich and detailed set of data. The researcher forms a list of 
themes and open-ended questions to be discussed, although they may slightly 
vary during the interviews. He may also change the order of questions if 
necessary. The respondents are free to elaborate on certain topics and can 
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lead the discussion into an area not previously considered by the researcher, 
but significant for his study. Thus, the interviewer may come up with new 
questions during the interview and even omit some of the previously formulated. 
(Saunders, et al. 2009.) 
The interview also helps to establish a personal contact with the respondent. 
Managers are more likely to be interviewed, rather than asked to complete a 
questionnaire, as it gives them an opportunity to talk freely about a certain topic 
without writing anything down. They may also be encouraged to give detailed 
and relevant information about a subject that is of particular interest to them. 
(Saunders, et al. 2009.) 
However, this research method is non-standardized and cannot be easily 
replicated, therefore affecting the reliability of results. In addition, it is hard to 
make generalizations about the entire population due to a small sample. 
(Saunders, et al. 2009.) 
The interview might be recorded to get more reliable data. Doing so allows the 
interviewer to concentrate on questioning and listening. It also enables to re-
listen to the interview at some point in the future. Furthermore, it helps to record 
the questions asked and repeat them in later interviews. (Saunders, et al. 
2009.)               
The researcher has applied two ways to conduct interviews. Representatives of 
the companies located in Saint-Petersburg were met in person. Those people 
who represented Moscow-based companies were interviewed by using video-
conference in Skype. Both types of interviews were conducted in a similar 
manner without any constraints or technical problems. The duration of 
interviews ranged from 20 to 25 minutes. All interviews were recorded with the 
permission of respondents and the obtained data was transcribed for further 
analysis. The quotes from the interviews were translated from Russian to 
English.                   
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4 Findings and discussion 
4.1 Propositions 1 and 2  
The findings did not support the first proposition. All respondents did not 
indicate significant problems with their store managers. Consistent with the 
theory, the managers did not have high-powered incentives to act in the best 
interest of their owners. Nevertheless, they were doing their jobs well. One of 
the respondents noted (Interview no. 5): 
“Perhaps it is great work of our human resource managers, who have hired 
them… In addition, we cannot guarantee that their behavior would be the same 
without our regular inspections.” 
Indeed, most of the area developers agreed that they were monitoring the 
restaurants on a regular basis to ensure proper performance of the 
management team. They also supported the author’s proposition that allocation 
of units plays a significant role in the monitoring process. This is what the OOO 
Donuts Project development manager said (Interview no. 3):  
“We have formed groups of units in certain districts: in the city center, up north, 
etc… This way we could lighten the work of our area managers. They do not 
have to go through the entire town to inspect a particular outlet; instead they 
have a specific location they are in charge of… We still have some locations 
where there are only few or even a single restaurant, but we take them into 
account when developing new units.” 
So, based on the findings, it can be argued that the agency problem is not 
necessarily present under all area development agreements. Nevertheless, it is 
suggested that ongoing monitoring is required to sustain the proper behavior of 
store managers. Good allocation of units is an essential factor in achieving this 
goal. 
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4.2 Proposition 3 
The findings supported this proposition. According to the respondents, a good 
location is a key to success in this business. But what is also important is 
maintaining a proper distance between the units. The OOO Bright Star 
managing partner stated (Interview no. 1):   
“We surely take into consideration the proximity of other restaurants. In respect 
to the food-court restaurant it has less influence, since the shopping center itself 
does not lose any traffic. If we see a crowded shopping center with good 
tenants, then we might open restaurant in there, even though we have already 
got an outlet in neighboring shopping mall. Concerning stationary restaurants, 
we access it more deeply depending on the customer flow. For instance, we 
have one restaurant at […] and another at […]; the walking distance is 10-15 
minutes. We know that one restaurant steals some portion of customer traffic 
from another, but the traffic is large enough for both restaurants to operate 
successfully. But, in general, we certainly do not place two restaurants close to 
each other.” 
Some respondents noted they are sometimes forced to open restaurants 
relatively close to each other to increase their brand presence. This happens 
mainly due to an escalating pressure from competing brands. For instance, 
OOO WenRus Restaurant Group is a relatively young player on Russian market 
and they find it quite challenging to compete with established chains. This is 
what their franchising director mentioned (Interview no. 5):      
“We know that if we do not open our restaurant at a particular spot, then our 
competitors will do that… You can see McDonald’s restaurants everywhere, 
and they always have numerous customers waiting in the lines, so it makes 
sense for them to open new units even close to each other. But we cannot let 
them occupy all decent spaces… ”. 
So, based on the findings, it can be suggested that franchisees would not be 
willing to open units in close proximity to each other in order to avoid 
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cannibalization of sales, unless they are forced to do so in certain 
circumstances, for example escalating competition. 
    
4.3 Proposition 4 
This proposition was supported by the findings. As indicated by the 
respondents, one of the main incentives to step into an area development 
agreement was total control over the brand in a particular market, both in terms 
of revenue streams and quality assurance. The OOO Coffee Set franchising 
director said (Interview no. 2):    
“We were excited to bring a new concept to our market. In the beginning it was 
challenging, as it required large investments and involved risks… Now we have 
an established chain of coffee shops where people can drink a perfect cup of 
coffee every day… From the very beginning, it was crucial to offer high-quality 
products to our customers. We did not want any other franchisee to screw it up, 
so we decided to open and operate outlets ourselves. Only after we have seen 
good results, we gradually started selling subfranchise rights to our partners in 
other towns…”                                           
Most of the franchisees were concerned with the quality of their products in the 
first phase of their development process. They did not want to rely on an 
opportunistic behavior of other operators, so they preferred to keep control over 
the operations until they achieved desirable outcomes. Some of the 
respondents indicated that they would also be willing to manage stores in other 
regions, if it was physically possible. But due to scarce resources and 
geographical constraints they had to restrict their ownership to a particular 
territory. 
 
4.4 Proposition 5 
The findings supported this proposition. By owning and operating all the units 
within a region, franchisees could avoid any deviation from their concept and 
sustain uniformity of the products and services provided. This was especially 
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important in a market with a high level of repeat customers. The OOO Bright 
Star managing partner offered his opinion on this as follows (Interview no. 1):      
“When customers come back, we have to offer a product that would be similar 
in every aspect. People like our signature burgers, design, way of serving, etc. 
This is what distinguishes us from other brands. So when the customer visits 
our restaurant over and over again, he has to be sure that he gets the same 
product he used to like…” 
Concerning the operational advantages, they were also achieved under an area 
development agreement. Respondents could enjoy economies of scale in both 
procurement and promotion, as was expected from the theory. It was also 
easier to adapt to local market and introduce new products. For example, unlike 
American “Carl’s Jr.” restaurants, Russian ones offered an option to replace soft 
drink with a beer. This option was quite popular among Russian customers and 
they could do so in every restaurant. Finally, uniformity enabled franchisees to 
take quality and similarity of products in different units as given and evaluate the 
restaurants based on other indicators, such as sales, average receipt, etc. 
 
4.5 Proposition 6                                                                                                               
The findings partly supported this proposition. Some mini-chains have 
experienced a greater transfer of knowledge between commonly owned units by 
means of regular communication and meetings. The OOO Donuts Project 
developing manager told (Interview no. 3):  
“We do have regular meetings for our managers and staff. The primary purpose 
of such meetings is professional development of workers. We organize them on 
a local level, so only closely located operators have an opportunity to attend 
these meetings…”                  
Other chains indicated using a centralized system to share information with their 
units. It did not facilitate the transfer of knowledge between outlets, but 
maintained communication between restaurants and the head office. The ZAO 
BRPI franchising director told (Interview no. 4):       
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“We assess the chain as a whole and establish practices applicable to all 
restaurants. They follow system-wide guidelines and do not interact with each 
other. The information goes to and comes from the central office, so it does not 
really matter whether the outlets are located close to each other…” 
So, although in theory using an area development agreement is expected to 
facilitate frequent communication and transfer of knowledge between outlets, in 
reality this depends on the particular system and its specific norms and 
practices.     
 
4.6 Proposition 7    
This proposition was not supported by the findings. Although it seemed 
reasonable to coordinate orders from different restaurants in order to get 
quantity discounts, most of the franchisees found the process difficult. One of 
the franchisees noted (Interview no. 3): 
“We cannot forecast the individual needs of different restaurants. It’s the job of 
our store managers to place orders based on their sales and inventory levels…”                           
Nevertheless, some franchisees agreed that they were granted certain 
allowances from their suppliers in exchange for ongoing orders from multiple 
units. According to the OOO Coffee Set franchising director, they have achieved 
such allowances (Interview no. 2):    
“Basically, we purchase from a single supplier. We have established a high 
level of commitment and long-term relationship with him. Undoubtedly, the fact 
that we operate multiple units enables us to purchase greater volumes over 
some time and bargain good deals… We do not necessarily purchase in bulk, 
but we keep our supplier loaded with orders…”           
So, as the findings suggest, multi-unit ownership may provide certain benefits in 
procurement. They do not necessarily come from a single purchase of a bigger 
size. Instead it is the process of continuous procurement for multiple outlets that 
makes a supplier willing to reduce prices.                                            
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4.7 Proposition 8 
This proposition was supported by the findings. Multi-unit owners, especially 
area developers, have to spend greater sums on advertising than single-unit 
franchisees. In addition, they have to establish cooperatives with local media 
firms to promote their restaurants. Although they get ongoing support from the 
franchisor, they are in charge of running local marketing campaigns. The OOO 
WenRus Restaurant Group franchising director told (Interview no. 5):  
“Our foreign partners supply us with advertising materials and all respective 
tools to promote our restaurants. They also show statistics in other countries. 
Still our market has its own specifics and we got to take into consideration 
people’s tastes and preferences. We spend substantial amount of our funds on 
marketing research and customer surveys…”                      
Most of the franchisees also agreed that being an exclusive owner allows them 
to spend the advertising funds in a way that maximizes their benefits. For 
example, they can focus on locations with low customer traffic and allocate 
more funds to promote nearby restaurants. The managing partner of OOO 
Bright Star supported this statement (Interview no. 1):  
“We have one restaurant that has a huge star logo and people can easily notice 
it. This logo is somewhat of a promotion tool by itself. On the other hand, we 
have a restaurant at the alley just around the corner from the busiest street in 
town. Many people walk by and do not realize that there is a restaurant right 
next to them. In order to attract new customers, we need more intensive 
promotion of this outlet… We can easily spend more money from our budget on 
this particular restaurant…”                         
Finally, the operators in question had more freedom to choose promotional 
techniques for their stores. For example, one respondent mentioned that after 
opening a new restaurant in a shopping mall, they put a huge banner hanging 
from the roof on the first floor. It was a large outlay and, if they had shared the 
territory with other franchisees, it would not have been fair to have such a 
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promotional tool leaving others out of their share. But, thanks to the exclusivity 
of their territory, they could afford to do so.                                      
 
5 Conclusion   
This study has investigated the concept of multi-unit franchising from the 
franchisee perspective. Specifically, it focused on managing fast-food outlets 
under an area development agreement. First the paper introduced the benefits 
and constraints that affect a franchisee’s choice of this type of ownership and 
continued with challenges and opportunities associated with developing and 
operating multiple units. For the purpose of this study, several propositions were 
made based on previous research and they were then tested by gathering and 
analyzing data via interviews with large area developers.  
Most of the suggested propositions were supported. As the findings indicate, 
franchisees involved in area development agreements do not necessarily face 
the agency problems of their store managers. They do, however, monitor their 
outlets on a regular basis and allocate new units in a way that facilitates 
monitoring process. The proximity of other units is also an important factor in 
allocation decisions. In addition, an area development agreement enables 
sustaining the good image of a mini-chain by controlling all restaurants within 
the market and avoiding the free-riding problems of other franchisees. 
Uniformity of products and services is another advantage of an area 
development agreement that was predicted based on the theory and observed 
in the case companies. The findings did not completely support the proposition 
concerning knowledge transfer between commonly owned units due to 
differences in companies’ practices. Concerning the procurement issues, all 
respondents did not indicate purchasing in bulk for multiple stores, so they 
could not achieve economies of scale in this way. Finally, consistent with the 
results, all area developers in question were in charge of deciding on the local 
advertising budget and making the only contributions, and had an authority to 
make the promotional decisions. 
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This study makes a contribution to the existing research on multi-unit 
franchising. It offers relevant data for both scholars and prospective 
franchisees. The scholars may use this study as a basis for future research and 
the prospective franchisees may find this material useful in assessing 
franchising opportunities. However, this study has certain limitations. First of all, 
the findings can be applicable mainly to fast-food restaurants. Secondly, the 
empirical data were obtained from Russian franchisees and might reflect the 
special features of this market. Finally, the sample is not large enough to make 
generalizations about the entire population. Therefore, further research might 
be needed to get more reliable and generalizable data. 
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Appendices                                                                 
 
Appendix 1: List of interview questions  
 
1. Did you have any prior experience in restaurant business?  
2. Have you used your own capital or borrowed funds for development? 
3. How economic crisis has influenced Russian fast-food market and your 
restaurants in particular? How it has affected the system’s growth rate?  
4. Have you agreed on ultimate number of restaurants to be opened with 
franchisor?  
5. Does franchisor specify concrete format of restaurant to be opened? 
6. Have you experienced any problems with your store managers? Do you 
provide any incentives to improve their performance? Do you conduct 
monitoring of the restaurants? Do you allocate your units in a way that 
facilitate monitoring process? 
7. Which factors do you take into consideration when choosing a place for 
new restaurant? Do you access proximity of existing restaurants? Have 
you experienced any negative outcomes of placing two or more outlets in 
relatively close proximity? 
8. Do you know any quality debasement practices in stores owned by other 
franchisees of your brand? Have you managed to sustain good quality of 
products and services by owning all units in your region? 
9. Does owning multiple restaurants under area development agreement 
allow you to maintain uniformity of your products and services? Have you 
managed to obtain such efficiencies, as (all prior-mentioned operational 
advantages)…? 
10. Do you have any mechanisms of knowledge transfer and mutual learning 
between your stores? 
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11. Do you have a single supplier for your stores? Do you purchase in bulk 
for your restaurants by consolidating the orders? Do you get any 
corresponding discounts from the supplier? 
12. How do you form your local advertising budget? Do you get any support 
from the franchisor? Do you have full discretion of spending advertising 
funds? Are you free to choose promotional techniques for your stores?      
 
       
